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FACTS
Chase and Charles Bryant, two African-Americans, were students at
Wynnewood Public Schools, part of the Independent School District No. I-
38 of Garvin County, Oklahoma (School District).' The Bryants fought with
Caucasian students at the school on February 8, 2000.2 The School District
had a "Fight Policy" that stated that the school would not tolerate fighting or
physical attacks between students.3 It also provided that a school would
suspend for the remainder of the semester any student with two offenses in a
semester.4 The Bryants violated this policy twice during the spring 2000
semester and the School District suspended them.' The School District did
not suspend the Caucasian students because this fight was their first violation
of the policy that semester.6
As part of their complaint, the Bryants claimed that the School
District contributed to or allowed a hostile educational environment prior to
the February 8, 2000 fight.7  The Bryants claimed that school officials
allowed students to inscribe racially offensive slurs, swastikas, and the letters
"KKK" on school furniture, as well as in notes placed in African-American
students' lockers and notebooks.8 The Bryants also alleged that atlthough
the school dress code policy prohibited students from wearing offensive and
disruptive clothing, Caucasian males often wore confederate flag t-shirts to
school in violation of the policy.9 The Bryants claimed that parents and
students complained to the school about all of these racially offensive acts,
but the school did nothing in response to the complaints.'
The Bryants brought this action in the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, seeking relief under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for violations of their civil rights." The Bryants stated three claims for
relief in the district court: 1) the School District intentionally discriminated
against them on the basis of race; 2) the School District's Fight Policy,
although neutral on its face, had a disparate impact on them because they
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were African-Americans; and 3) the School District created and contributed
to a racially hostile environment before the February 8, 2000 fight.'
2
The district court granted summary judgment for the School District,
finding that the Bryants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to
support their allegation that the School District had intentionally
discriminated against them on the basis of race. 13  In addition, the district
court found that, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v.
Sandoval,14 no private right of action existed under Title VI to remedy
unintentional discrimination.' 5 Because the district court characterized the
Bryants' claims of disparate impact and of contribution to the existence of a
hostile educational environment as unintentional forms of discrimination, it
determined that the Bryants had no private right of action to pursue those
claims.' 6 The Bryants appealed the decisions of the district court.
17
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the principal and administrators of the
School District intentionally allowed, facilitated, and maintained a racially
hostile educational environment.' 8  The Tenth Circuit reinstated and
remanded the Bryants' claim for reconsideration under the Davis19 deliberate
indifference test.20  The court held that because the School District
sufficiently demonstrated that it had no discriminatory intent or purpose in
suspending the students, the district court correctly granted summary
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that there is no private right of action to
enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI). In Sandoval, a driver's license
applicant sued the Alabama Department of Public Safety, alleging that its policy of administering license
examinations only in the English language violated federal regulations enacted under Title VI forbidding
the use of methods that have the effect of discriminating. Id. at 278-79. The Supreme Court held that
Congress intended to give individuals a private right of action to enforce section 601 of Title VI, which
prohibits only intentional discrimination by groups that receive federal funds, id. at 280-81, but did not
intend to provide individuals with a private right of action to enforce the regulations developed under
section 602 to enforce section 601, id. at 293.
15 Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38, 334 F.3d 928, 929 (10th Cir. 2003).
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is Id. at 933.
19 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (stating that a Title IX private
damages action could lie where a federal funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts
of harassment within his or her control, where the recipient's response was clearly unreasonable in the
circumstances, and where the harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as to bar the
victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit).
20 Bryant, 334 F.3d at 933-34.
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judgment in favor of the School District on the issue of intentional
discrimination.2'
ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit first noted that it reviews a district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo." The court must look at the facts as originally
presented and decide whether the record demonstrates that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. 23  If no genuine issue of material fact exists,
the court must grant the moving party's motion.24
Next, the court analyzed the Bryants' first two claims: whether the
district court appropriately granted summary judgment for the School
District on the issue of intentional discrimination and whether Title VI gives
the Bryants a private right of action for disparate impact claims.25 Both
claims arose from the fight and the subsequent suspension.26 Because this
n 27was a "discharge" case, the court applied the allocation of burdens of proof
from Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine28 to determine
whether the Bryants could survive the School District's motion for summary
judgment.29 Although Burdine involved a Title VII discriminatory treatment
21 Id. at 930.
22 Id. at 929.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
24 Id.
25 Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38, 334 F.3d 928, 929-30 (10th Cir. 2003).
26 Id. at 929.
27 See id. (indicating that a suspension from school is analogous to a Title VI1 discriminatory
discharge from employment).
28 Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (holding that a defendant in a
Title VII case bears only the burden of explaining the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions after a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination). In Burdine, a female employee
sued her former employer, alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. at 251. The
Supreme Court explained the allocation of burdens in a Title VII case:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Third, should the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination rejection.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
The Court held that after the plaintiff proves the prima facie case of discrimination, the employer bears
only the burden of explaining, and not persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence, the
nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action. See id. at 254-57.
29 Bryant, 334 F.3d at 930.
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claim, 30 the Bryant court stated that it and other courts often use a Title VII
proof-shifting model for Title VI burden allocations.3'
In a Title VI discharge claim, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
proof.32 The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a
preponderance of evidence.33 If the plaintiff successfully proves his or her
prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.34 The defendant
must present a valid, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge of the
plaintiff.35 If the court finds that the defendant has met this burden, the
burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff.36 The plaintiff must then prove
that the reasons the defendant offered were not its actual reasons for the
discharge, but were a pretext to discriminate.37 Although the burden of proof
shifts, the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuading the court that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.
38
The court determined that the Bryants' allegation that the School
District suspended them but not the Caucasian students established a prima
facie case of discrimination. 39 The School District then met its burden of
proof by demonstrating that it had a legitimate reason for suspending the
students because the School District's Fight Policy required that the school
must suspend any student who violated the policy twice in a semester.
40
Both of the Bryants had violated the policy twice, but the Caucasian students
had not.4' Additionally, the School District proved that the school had
consistently suspended students who violated the Fight Policy twice; it had
suspended ten students under the policy, six of whom were Caucasians, and
four, including the Bryants, who were African-Americans.42 The court found
that the Bryants raised no evidence in the record to indicate that the School
District's reasons for the suspensions were pretextual. 43 As a result, the court
affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the School
District on the intentional discrimination claim.44
30 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 250.
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The court next considered the Bryants' disparate impact claim.45
The court held that the Bryants failed to prove that the School District's
reasons for the suspension were a pretext for discrimination.46 Because the
court found an independent basis for summary judgment on the disparate
impact claim, it chose not to address whether Sandoval foreclosed the
Bryants' disparate impact claim.
47
Finally, the court considered the Bryants' third issue on appeal:
whether Title VI provides a private right of action or remedy for a racially
hostile educational environment. 4' The court examined the language of
sections 601 and 602 of Title VI in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Sandoval.4 9 The court, relying on Sandoval, stated that the plain language of
section 601 of Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination based on
race, color, or national origin by groups that receive federal funds.50 Section
602 allows federal agencies to enforce section 601 by issuing rules and
regulations that help achieve the purpose of the statute." In Sandoval, the
Supreme Court held that Congress intended to give individuals a private right
of action to enforce section 60152 but did not intend to provide individuals
with a private right of action to enforce the rules or regulations developed
under section 602."
In light of Sandoval, the court determined that the true issue in the
case was whether permitting a racially hostile environment is, or could ever
be, an intentional act.5 4 Sandoval would likely preclude disparate impact
cases because those claims focus on neutral policies that have an
unintentional discriminatory effect on particular persons.55 If, however,
hostile environment claims such as the Bryants' had an element of intent,
Title VI would allow such claims.
5 6
The court examined the facts that the Bryants alleged in support of
their claim that the school officials intentionally created or contributed to a
hostile environment or both.57 On a motion for summary judgment, the court
must take the facts as alleged by the non-moving party as true. 8 In addition,
45 Id. at 929-30.
46 Id. at 930.
47 Id. at 930-3 1.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 93 1.
so Id. See also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (stating that it is beyond dispute
"that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination").
51 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89.
52 Id. at 280.
53 Id. at 293.
54 Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38, 334F.3d 928, 931 (2003).
55 Id. at 932 (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 932-33.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 933.
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the court must interpret the facts and reasonable deductions in favor of the
non-moving party. 9 The Bryants alleged that Caucasian male students in the
school wore racially offensive clothing, displayed racially offensive
messages and stickers on their vehicles, and wrote racially offensive words
on school furniture and notes they gave to the Bryants.60 The Bryants further
alleged that the principal knew of the situation due to complaints by parents
and students6' but took no action to remedy the situation until after the
February 8, 2000 fight.62
On such facts, the court determined that a jury could find that the
principal's inaction implied intent.63 The jury could then hold the principal
liable for affirmatively choosing not to remedy the hostile environment and
thereby choosing to maintain the environment.64 The court stated that it
would be irresponsible for a court to hold that maintaining a hostile
environment could never be an intentional act because, by doing so, a court
would allow school officials to ignore egregious student-on-student
discrimination. 65 The court indicated that because school administrators play
an active role in leading students and setting the standard for their behavior,
courts should hold administrators to a standard of behavior higher than that
of a mere bystander.66 The court made clear that this ruling did not create an
affirmative duty for school administrators to actively hunt for and uncover
instances of discrimination in order to prevent liability under section 601 .67
Instead, the court held that if a parent or student makes the school
administrator aware of severe instances of intentional discrimination and the
administrator intentionally fails to remedy the situation, that administrator is
potentially liable under section 601.68
On remand, the court instructed the district court to apply the Davis
v. Monroe County Board of Education69 test to the facts of the case.70 In
Davis, the Supreme Court held that under Title IX, a plaintiff has a private
right of action for damages where school officials act with deliberate
indifference to student-on-student harassment. 7' Although Title IX deals
with intentional sexual discrimination, the Bryant court concluded that
s9 Id. at 93 1.
6 Id. at 932.
61 Id. at 932-33.
62 Id.






69 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
70 Id. at 633.
71 Id.
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Congress based the language of Title IX on that of Title VI.72 Thus, the
Davis court's determination of what qualifies as intentional discrimination
under Title IX is directly analogous to what qualifies as intentional
discrimination under Title VI. 73 Under the Davis test, a plaintiff's claim will
survive only where the administrator was deliberately indifferent to
harassment of which he or she had actual knowledge, and the harassment
was so "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" that it can be said to
have effectively barred the victim of the right to use or benefit from the
educational opportunities provided by the school.74
CONCURRING OPINION
Chief Judge Tacha wrote a separate concurrence to assert that the
district court erred in applying Sandoval to the Bryants' theory of liability
and to emphasize that the Davis test creates a narrow and heavily qualified
range of facts which could support a finding of liability under the deliberate
indifference theory. First, Judge Tacha asserted that the district court
incorrectly applied Sandoval to the Bryants' theory of liability because it
they based it on criteria from a regulation created under the power granted by
section 602. 75 According to Judge Tacha, the Sandoval Court held only that
section 601 determines the boundaries of the existence of a private right of
action.76 Even under Sandoval, therefore, it is possible that language in a
regulation developed pursuant to the power of section 602 may invoke the
private right of action created by section 601.77 Thus, the district court erred
in reasoning that because the plaintiffs relied on a regulation created under
section 602, the court had to grant summary judgment for the defendants.78
Second, Judge Tacha warned that because the Davis test is
extensively qualified and allows for only a narrow set of facts that can
support liability, the district court should exercise careful in its applying
Davis to the facts of the instant case.79 Judge Tacha stated that the district
court should apply the Davis test to this case by first asking whether student-
on-student conduct at the Bryants' school established a racially hostile
educational environment.80 Second, the district court should determine
72 Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38, 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2003).
73 Id.
74 Davis, 526 U.S. at 633; see also Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238
(10th Cir. 1999) (applying the Davis test in a Title IV deliberate indifference claim).
75 Bryant, 334 F.3d at 934-35.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 936.
78 Id. at 935-36.
79 Id. at 935, 938.
8o Id. at 937.
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whether the School District acted deliberately indifferent to this environment
or conduct."' Judge Tacha also made clear that the deliberate indifference
standard is higher than the "reasonableness" standard.8 2 To avoid liability
under the Davis test, the School District must merely have responded to the
peer harassment in a manner that was not clearly unreasonable in light of the
known situation."3
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Tenth Circuit held that creation or maintenance of a
racially hostile educational environment could be an intentional act.8 4 This
designation puts the claim of a racially hostile environment within the types
of intentional discrimination claims for which section 601 of Title VI
provides a remedy and demonstrates an expansion of the deliberate
indifference theory. Previously, courts within the Tenth Circuit had
extended the deliberate indifference theory of recovery only to Title IX
cases,85 allowing plaintiffs to recover damages if an authority figure had
actual knowledge of and was deliberately indifferent to a sexually hostile or
86discriminatory environment. By expanding the range of possible theories
of recovery, the Bryant ruling should create more findings of liability under
Title VI within the Tenth Circuit, despite the narrowness of the Davis
deliberate indifference standard.
The impact of this decision could also influence other circuits'
decisions on hostile environment claims based on race discrimination.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Davis, most circuits have
extended the deliberate indifference test to Title IX sexually hostile
environment claims.8 7 Further, as the Bryant court stated, because Congress
based Title IX on Title VI courts can apply Davis directly to a determination
of Title VI intentional racial discrimination. 8 Because other circuits have
adopted and applied the Davis standard in Title IX cases, it seems likely that
s1 Id.
82 Id. at 938.
s3 Id.; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648-49 (1929) (describing
clearly unreasonable standard).
84 Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38, 334 F.3d 928, 933 (10th Cir. 2003).
85 See Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying the
four factors of a Davis claim to a Title IX suit alleging failure to remedy student-on-student sexual
harassment).
86 See id. at 1246-49 (holding that a mother stated a claim for relief when she alleged that school
officials had actual knowledge of and were deliberately indifferent to the alleged sexual harassment of her
daughter).
87 E.g., Hawkins v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279 (11 th Cir. 2003); Saxe v. State
College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001); Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d
253 (6th Cir. 2000); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000).
88 Bryant, 334 F.3d at 934.
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it is only a matter of time before other circuits apply the deliberate
indifference test to Title VI cases alleging racially hostile environments.
The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have recently considered the
theory of deliberate indifference in the context of a Title VI claim.89 These
Circuits declined to extend Davis's deliberate indifference theory to the Title
VI claims they considered, but this does not affect the likelihood that courts
will apply the deliberate indifference test to Title VI intentional racial
discrimination claims. In these cases, the plaintiffs alleged disparate impact,
not the creation or maintenance of a racially hostile environment. These
cases determined that disparate impact was an unintentional form of
discrimination; therefore, no private right of action existed to enforce such
claims under section 601. The Bryant court declined to address the Bryants'
disparate impact claim, and left open the question of whether Sandoval
would foreclose that claim. 90 Thus, the Bryant decision does not contradict
the decisions of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits. Instead, the Bryant
court dealt with the hostile environment claim, and found that the creation of
a hostile environment could be intentional, thus allowing for a private right
of action under section 601.9'
Further, other courts have applied the deliberate indifference theory
to allow or disallow recovery in such diverse claims as those brought under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act,92 the Eighth Amendment,93 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 The trend that develops from these
cases is the expansion, not contraction, of the deliberate indifference theory
of recovery. Considering the expansion found in these cases, as well as
various circuits' application of the deliberate indifference test to Title IX
claims, which are directly analogous to Title VI claims, it seems likely that
within the next few years, other circuits will allow plaintiffs to recover
damages under the deliberate indifference theory for Title VI intentional
discrimination claims, including the creation or maintenance of a racially
hostile environment.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Susan K. Richter
89 Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003); Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288
F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002); see Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F.Supp.2d 799 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (stating that
"the Sixth Circuit has not adopted the deliberate indifference test for Title VI cases").
90 Bryant v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38, 334 F.3d 928, 930-31 (10th Cir. 2003).
91 Id. at 933.
92 E.g., Swenson v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Wyo. 2003).
93 E.g., Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Kan. 2003).
9 E.g., Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999).
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